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Marcum, J.A.: An Introductory Philosophy of Medicine.
Milton Keynes, U.K.: Springer, 2008. 369 pages. ISBN
978-1402067969. Price: £ 94.50.
There are actually not too many introductory books in the
field of philosophy of medicine. To meet this need, James
Marcum, a philosopher of science with a background in
physiology, has written An Introductory Philosophy of
Medicine, with the subtitle Humanizing Modern Medicine.
The main title is promising and clear but the subtitle is
obscure, at least until the author’s agenda is clarified in the
first few pages.
Marcum opens with a general discussion about the
nature of philosophy of medicine. The very clear intro-
duction builds, for example, upon Edmund Pellegrino’s
distinction between a philosophy in medicine, a philosophy
of medicine, and a third relationship, philosophy and
medicine. Marcum seems to agree with William Stempsey
who has noted that there has ‘‘always been a philosophy
lurking behind medical thought and practice’’. The rest of
the book is divided into three parts, which examine the
metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical foundations of
medicine. Practically everything in this vast area is covered
at least briefly. The approach is top-down, that is, philo-
sophical theory is introduced first and its implications to
medical practice are shortly discussed later.
There are two major problems that interfere with the joy
of reading this book. Firstly, a crisis in the quality of care is
presented as a starting point. Such a crisis is, however, far
too easily taken for granted and neither defined nor
described. Whether such a crisis exists or not is an
empirical question and should be treated as such. Where is
the evidence, for example, that the quality of care at some
previous point in time has been higher than it is today?
Secondly, a dichotomy between biomedicine and humane
medicine is presented as another starting point. The source of
(almost) all problems is the biomedical model, according to
which ‘‘the patient is a machine composed of individual
body parts that, when broken or lost, can be fixed or replaced
by new parts’’. A physician working in the context of this
model chooses the therapeutic modality, ‘‘often with little
patient consultation’’, and sees death as a defeat that should
be avoided at all costs. The medical profession ‘‘values
emotionally detached concern or a chastened or masculin-
ized form of empathy over genuine or authentic empathic
care’’. Luckily, the world can be saved by the recently
emerged humanistic or humane models of medicine. Here
the author has built a straw man—‘‘biomedical practi-
tioner’’—and gives his sympathies to the brave ‘‘humanistic
practitioner’’ in the fight over the future of medicine. But the
medical world is not that simple and the dichotomy is,
instead, more annoying than helpful.
These two problems are not minor in a book written by a
philosopher of science who specialises in philosophy of
medicine. It is, however, possible to read the book and
simply leave these issues aside. Essentially, it is a rich
source book, as the back cover proclaims: ‘‘the book’s
unique features include a comprehensive coverage of the
various topics in the philosophy of medicine that have
emerged over the past several decades and a philosophical
context for embedding bioethical discussions’’. This is
certainly true, and the author is to be congratulated. Con-
trary to another claim on the back cover, however, I am
sceptical about the book’s suitability for textbook purposes,
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at least for undergraduate courses. There is simply far too
much material for beginners.
Pekka Louhiala
Helsinki, Finland
Kuppuswamy, C.: The International Legal Governance of
the Human Genome. Abingdon: Routledge, 2009. 210
pages. ISBN 978-0-415-45857-3. Price: £75.
In this book, Kuppuswamy identifies the human genome as
a milestone step in scientific progress and seeks to describe
and criticise governance frameworks applied to it which
may lead to inequality in a number of different settings.
She argues that in order to govern the human genome in a
meaningful way, a unified theory of human rights must be
advanced and distinctions between positive and negative
rights set aside.
Kuppuswamy’s book is divided into six parts and a
conclusion. Initially, she focuses on the human genome and
bioethics before describing the connection between inter-
national organisations and the human genome. Parts three
and four discuss the concept of common heritage of mankind
concept, and part five puts this notion into the context of
human rights. Part six investigates the common heritage in
relation to intellectual property rights. The conclusion spans
seven pages and is followed by an annex (the Universal
Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights).
Some of Kuppuswamy’s chapter structuring takes getting
used to and it is still not immediately clear why the annex
was necessary, particularly given the easy accessibility of
such texts online. Her initial discussion of bioethics seems to
unfortunately only scrape the surface. In particular, there
may be plausible diverging opinions in relation to her
assertion, following Kaplan, that bioethics emerged from the
ashes of the holocaust. Far more convincing is Miola’s well-
argued point that the Nuremberg Trials were simply a
renaissance rather than a naissance of ethics in this field
(cf. Miola (2007) Medical Ethics and Medical Law—A
Symbiotic Relationship. Hart, Oxford). It is also a valid
question which remains unanswered whether bioethics and
medical ethics are easily equated. Kuppuswamy may have
done her otherwise well-argued book a disservice by not
delving into sufficient depth here, though the narrow remit of
the text may justify the brevity of her exploration of bioethics.
Overall, Kuppuswamy writes with great clarity and
accessibility and the book is a worthwhile read. She is quite
right in identifying human rights concepts as pivotal in any
regime aimed at governing subjects (or indeed objects!) of
international law of the magnitude of the human genome.
The proposal forwarded by her in this book is an excellent
addition to literature addressing different notions of
viewing property in relation to new science. Whilst it is
certainly recommended reading for scholars working in
this area, the high price of the volume may dissuade some.
Nils Hoppe
Hanover, Germany
Tealdi, J.C. (ed.): Diccionario Latinoamericano de Bioe´-
tica. Bogota´: UNESCO- Red Latinoamericana y del Caribe
de Bioe´tica- Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 2008. 657
pages. ISBN 978-9587019742. Price: COL $ 90. Freely
available online at: http://www.unesco.org.uy/shs/es/areas-
de-trabajo/ciencias-sociales/bioetica/documentos-publicaciones-
en-bioetica.html.
This volume, published under the auspices of UNESCO’s
Bioethics Network for Latin America and the Caribbean,
and the editorial leadership of Juan Carlos Tealdi, presents
an updated overview of Latin American culture and tradi-
tion, as they pertain to bioethics and allied disciplines like
philosophy, sociology, anthropology and psychology.
Written by over 150 scholars from 16 regional countries, this
major academic effort has resulted in a unique and com-
prehensive text that goes way beyond the semantic function
of a dictionary, to fulfill the task of a conceptual encyclo-
pedia. Selecting authors according to their expertise and
commitment was far from simple, considering the sub-
stantial variety in size, resources, academic development
and dedication to bioethics and the humanities of the
countries that constitute the Spanish and Portuguese
speaking Latin American nations.
The Diccionario has 27 sections, with alphabetically
ordered titles ranging from ‘‘Bioethics’’ to ‘‘Liberty’’, from
‘‘Human Body’’ to ‘‘Knowledge and Truth’’. Each section
includes a number of entries covering a variety of topics
that combine the specific and current concerns of bioethics,
with cultural themes that are of major importance in the
history and social reality of Latin America. Among the 234
entries, the reader finds contributions discussing regional
philosophy, indigenous oral tradition, politics, human
rights, research ethics including exploitation and biopiracy.
Equal importance is given to particular bioethical issues
like reproductive health, unsafe abortion, euthanasia,
maternal mortality, medical decision-taking. In dealing with
these specific topics, most authors have judiciously pre-
sented the current international state of the debate in addition
to discussing local realities and conceptual trends, as shown
by the balanced mix of regional and international references
at the end of each entry.
Latin America has a long history of colonial oppression
and political unrest often leading to prolonged and extre-
mely harsh dictatorships. Since conspicuous socioeconomic
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disparities tend to prevail, social tension surfaces from time
to time as the better off cling to their privileges, ethnic
groups defend their roots and rights, and cultural diversity
seeks tolerance, respect and support. Latin American bio-
ethics reflects these contextual realities, being more con-
cerned with justice than autonomy, state responsibility in
health care and demanding remedial policies to reduce
poverty, need and marginalization. Autochthonous per-
spectives have emerged and are duly covered in the Dic-
cionario: bioethics of intervention endorsing political
engagement, ethics of protection encouraging empower-
ment to face social and environmental challenges, ethics of
liberation in search of justice, emphasis on human rights and
the dignity of human beings in an effort to prevent exploi-
tation and abusive domination.
Latin American bioethics and the realities that inspire its
themes and practices are presented in a vivid, scholarly and
elegant way. The wealth of insider information will
hopefully overcome the shallow, birds-eye view of external
observers and, since dictionaries are by definition not
translatable, scholars from highly developed countries are
urged to seek linguistic assistance in order not to miss this
highly commendable intellectual effort.
Miguel Kottow
Santiago, Chile
Lyall, C., Papaioannou, T., and Smith, J. (eds.): The Limits
to Governance: The Challenge of Policy-Making for the
New Life Sciences. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2009. 300 pages.
ISBN: 978-0754675082. Price: £60.
This edited volume is turning the debate about the ‘limits of
the state’ into the question about what limits governance. By
making an important step in bringing an old discussion to
new frontiers, the book seeks to offer a critique of the ‘‘new’’
(although not as new) governance agenda, according to
which the informal authority of policy networks and non-
governmental actors replaces the formal authority of ‘gov-
ernment’. In an excellent literature review on governance,
the editors make the case that the move from government to
governance presents problems of accountability, transpar-
ency and legitimacy. Exclusive policy networks can, in
practice, reduce open democratic debate, as compromises
are negotiated between interested parties outside established
political processes and institutions. In three sections, struc-
tured around the ‘principles’, ‘processes’ and ‘people’ of
governance, the book locates this debate in the context of the
governance/government of the life sciences and genomics.
The various contributions all show that the life sciences
still require a considerable mix of government and gover-
nance. Against the idea of a ‘hollowing out of the state’, the
book’s diagnosis is the co-existence of government and
governance in a continuum, not in the sense that any policy
situation is either government or governance, but rather as
the possibility that the two co-exist any time. Its central
message reads therefore that the challenge for the future of
the life sciences is ‘‘to incorporate the most useful aspects
of governance-based approaches and reconcile them with
the still necessary systems of regulation in a way that does
not exclude key stakeholders—such as the pharmaceutical
industry—from the policy debate’’ (p. 10).
While none of these observations are innovative or ground-
breaking, the book’s strength lies in the fact that it turns this
problem into an object of more systematic study in a book, in
the context of the life sciences and genomics, and in thorough
empirical case studies ranging across different biotechnology
applications and continents in Europe, America and with
particular emphasis on Africa. Based on its strength, the book
will certainly become a relevant reference book and student
textbook in the field of genetics and society studies. Less
convincing, however, are its theoretical advancements.
It is arguable, whether the present-day study of ‘governance’
separates so strictly between non-governmental actors and
policy networks as ‘governance’ and formal regulation and
the resilience of the state as ‘government’. Much rather it
seems that governance is more often than not inclusive of
both. Although governance implies the emergence of new
actors and forms of participation, surely not many would
agree that this has diminished the role of the state.
In the development of its critique, the book does
unfortunately not succeed to make a substantial conceptual
contribution to existing literature on governance, other than
its delivery of empirical evidence in the various case
studies. While it is true that the challenges for policy-
making for the new life sciences cannot be tackled simply
by greater consultation, as the book concludes, its call for
wider inclusion of key stakeholders, e.g. the pharma-
industry, can certainly also not be the answer. This is not
particularly insightful, as it is not the case that these actors
are excluded from policy networks, but what is more, as
part of the ‘problem’, key stakeholders can certainly not
resolve the future challenges of the life sciences.
Kerstin Klein
London, UK
Mu¨ller, O., Clausen, J., and Maio, G. (eds): Das technisi-
erte Gehirn. Neurotechnologien als Herausforderung fu¨r
Ethik und Anthropologie. Paderborn: Mentis, 2009. 507
pages. ISBN: 978-3897856295. Price: € 38.
The unanticipated success story of deep brain stimulation
as a treatment of Parkinson’s disease has sparked enormous
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interest in technical neuromodulation and brain-computer
interfaces generally. Researchers from neuroscience and
engineering science strive to find ways to bring human
neurons and computer chips together and make them
communicate with one another. While the direct physical
communication between neurons and chips is still a chal-
lenge for the future, there are already certain techniques
that bridge the gap between the nervous system and
machines—think of the electrodes in Parkinson patients’
brains, the cochlea implant or sophisticated EEG programs
that help paralyzed patients write sentences on the com-
puter solely by their thoughts and their attention. How do
these neurotechnologies shape our selves and our human
nature? We are the ethical boundaries to developing and
using these techniques?
Oliver Mu¨ller, Jens Clausen and Giovanni Maio now
published a voluminous book on the anthropological and
ethical questions surrounding the new neurotechnologies.
They edited a collection of German articles written mostly
by junior researchers who participated in a neuroethics
summer school funded by the German Ministry of Edu-
cation and Science. The merit of this publication is the
multidisciplinary perspective ranging from Microsystems
technology and medicine to psychology, philosophy and
law.
The book is structured in thematic categories. In the first
part, clinical researchers present exciting examples of
neurotechnologies that are meant to sense and suppress
epileptic seizures in the brain or move artificial limbs by
the force of thoughts in locked-in patients. A second part
focuses on sociocultural aspects including the economic
dynamics of the new market for profitable neurotechnolo-
gies. The third and fourth section comprises articles that
discuss ethical criteria and the problem of personhood in
the context of neurotechnologies. One of the most inter-
esting articles poses the question: what the latest neuro-
scientific insights into human morality can tell us about
possible effects of neurotechnologies on humans as moral
agents? May deep brain stimulation be one day used to
improve our moral behaviour or shape the moral attitudes
and actions of people? Another insightful article explores
how the notion of responsibility could make sense in a
world of neurotechnologies. Another section of the book
concerns neurotechnological enhancement, and the last
section discusses how the self image of human beings may
be affected by these new technologies.
Overall, this is a comprehensive and thorough approach
to ethical and anthropological questions raised by the new
neurotechnologies that directly link brains and computers.
Most articles are well written and clearly structured.
Unfortunately, the introduction falls short of giving a good
overview of the book’s whole content, and a subject index
at the end of the book is lacking. The difference between
the new neurotechnologies and classic neurosurgery (or
psychosurgery) is sometimes blurred and would be worth
reflecting upon. The book is well suited for scholars in
neuroscience, neuroethics and neurophilosophy, but may
also be inspiring and thought-provoking for a wider
(unfortunately only German-speaking) academic and
public readership.
Ralf J. Jox
Munich, Germany
Evans, M., Ahlze´n, R., Heath, I., Macnaughton, J. (eds.),
Medical Humanities Companion. Volume One: Symptom.
Oxford: Radcliffe Publishing, 2008. 136 pages. ISBN: 978-
1846192869. Price: £21.95.
Medical Humanities Companion is a collective work
starting in Volume One on ‘‘Symptom’’, with the editors’
declared intention to ask questions about the meaning of
actual symptoms and about the concept of ‘‘symptom’’
itself from a convergent range of disciplinary expertise,
aiming to a genuine fusion of disciplinary insights, dis-
courses and metaphors.
By means of the fictionalised stories of four patients
who represent a variety of ages, symptom experiences and
types of underlying clinical condition, the book collects
simultaneously a cumulative interdisciplinary understand-
ing of illness as a human need, and of clinical medicine as a
human response to it.
Throughout the book, symptoms are examined under
linguistic, semiotic and philosophical point of view. In
Volume One, the authors are attempting to take the notion
of symptom as a starting point for trying to take seriously
the fusion of the material and the existential, that is, the
conscious human experience.
The idea of a symptom is important for understanding
the structure of clinical practice. Real, actual symptoms are
always experienced by real, actual individuals –much of
those experiences are mediated by language, culture,
expectation and the conventions of the clinical consulta-
tion. It is necessary somehow to take seriously the patient’s
subjectivity. This means taking seriously the content of the
patient’s individual point of view, the way of life that has
led up to the disease, the meanings and connotations that
inform it, and the way it is shaped by other people. From
the perspectives of clinical understanding and decision
making, thoughts and attitudes of the patient are to be taken
in account as seriously as the generalised truths about the
human organism supplied by natural sciences. The natural
sciences give us knowledge that defines the boundaries of
rational conceptions of what people might do. However
there is need to look elsewhere (to the humanities and
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social sciences) to understand the basis of people’s atti-
tudes towards what they should do, and their motives for
what they in fact do. Body and mind have to be related with
wider strategies of comprehension, and symptom can be an
effective trigger for going deeper inside through the over-
lapping cultural and biological layers which all together
constitute the human being and his sufferings. Each chapter
shows how different disciplines from medical humanities
can offer supplementary tools in order to take care of the
suffering individuals better than only curing their diseases.
The goal of the book is only partially achieved because it
remains in the field of the intellectual knowledge instead of
enlightening the true meaning of ‘‘humanity’’. After such a
sound analysis it would had been valuable to focus also on
the real practice of humanity in medical care, and what role
it can play in the improvement of the doctor-patient
relationship.
Rossana Becarelli
Turin, Italy
Have, H. ten, Jean, M. (eds.): The UNESCO Universal
Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights. Background,
principles and application. Paris: UNESCO, 2009. 370
pages. ISBN: 978-9231040887. Price: € 26.
This book is a veritable feast. It contains chapters authored
mostly by members of the UNESCO International Bio-
ethics Committee (IBC) who were themselves intimately
involved in the development of this important but chal-
lenging international instrument. The 15 ethical principles
in the Declaration (articles 3–17) are addressed by 26
authors (many from Europe, one from the US, and the rest
from around the world) who responded to 3 questions
pertaining to the reasons why the article was included in
the Declaration, its meaning in the context of the Decla-
ration, and how it might be applied. The editors, Henk ten
Have and Michele Jean, are both world renowned scholars,
the former a physician with a strong background in phi-
losophy, who headed UNESCO’s Division of Ethics of
Science and Technology during the prolonged period of
negotiations and development of the Declaration; the latter
a historian and bioethicist from the University of Montreal,
who chaired IBC between 2003 and 2005. In their preface
they magnificently provide a historical background for the
Declaration, including why and how UNESCO took on this
incredibly challenging task.
The book resonated with me very much: in my clinical
life, especially in organ transplantation; later at the
University of Toronto’s Joint Centre for Bioethics; in my
current research on global health issues; and now as a
member of the IBC I have had occasion to deal with
almost all the issues in the Declaration, from the complex
definitional issues around the concept of human dignity
(Article 3); the apparently mundane but ever-changing
issue of consent (Article 6); the still little known principle
of ‘‘respect for human vulnerability and personal integ-
rity’’ (Article 8); the currently very topical article (9) on
the principle of privacy and confidentiality, which is now
under severe challenge in the age of personalized
genomics and the Internet (I recall the comment by Sun
Microsystem’s co-founder Bill Joy that ‘‘Privacy is dead.
Get over it’’); to Article 17 on ‘‘protecting the environ-
ment, the biosphere and biodiversity.’’
For me, however, the most important principle is dis-
cussed in Article 12 on the principle of ‘‘respect for cultural
diversity and pluralism.’’ The tension here is captured well
in the observation that the IBC had to take into account on
the one hand, cultural diversity, in that ‘‘ethical positions
depend on the value system specific to each society in
accordance with its cultural traditions’’, and, on the other,
universality, because ‘‘the internationally recognized idea
of universality on which human rights are funded is crucial
to ethics’’. I think that the Declaration has managed to
negotiate this delicate tension extremely well, without
being so bland that it has little guiding value.
Although I joined the IBC after the Declaration was
adopted by UNESCO’s General Conference on 19th
October 2005, I have since been involved in the further
elaboration of the text, and am currently involved in work
on Article 14 on ‘‘Social Responsibility and Health’’. In the
process I have observed just how professionally, efficiently
and responsibly Henk ten Have has managed the whole
complex process, which not only calls for managerial skills
but also diplomatic abilities. We all owe him a huge debt of
gratitude for the enormous accomplishments in running the
Division so well, managing the process of developing the
Declaration, and the superb way in which he has set up the
process of not only its further elaboration but also its dis-
semination, his encouragement of the establishment of
national bioethics commissions/committees, and of the
development of bioethics curricula and teaching materials
based on this Declaration.
The book is a scholarly yet approachable document, as
much history as bioethics per se, and I highly recommend it
to all who have even a remote interest in this rapidly
changing field- a moving feast that will keep traveling for a
long time. Serious scholars of bioethics, especially those
interested in the tension between universal values and local
cultural determinants of ethics, will find this book extre-
mely valuable.
Abdallah Daar
Toronto, Canada
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Hardegger, J.: Willenssache. Die Infragestellung der
Willensfreiheit durch moderne Hirnforschung als Heraus-
forderung fu¨r Theologie und Ethik. Mu¨nster: LIT, 2009.
199 pages. ISBN 978-3643800145. Price: € 18.90.
The debate on free will is probably the most widely known
and most publicly discussed aspect of neurobiological
research. With her dissertation, Judith Hardegger has written
a short, but comprehensive and very readable introduction.
She first discusses the provocation of neurobiology,
based on the experiments of Benjamin Libet, their critique
and extension by Haggard/Eimer and the consequences
made popular by the publications of Roth and Singer: there
is no free will; everything is determined by neural activi-
ties. The second part describes the critical reaction, not
only philosophical and theological, but also by represen-
tatives in criminal law and neurobiologists themselves. The
third part finally presents the author’s own arguments
against the deterministic challenge to free will: that human
freedom is far from being unconditioned, but makes
allowances for physical and above all neuronal constraints.
In the very last ten pages she formulates an outlook of not
to ‘‘throw out the baby with the bath water’’, but rather
learn from neurobiological findings.
The strength of this book undeniably lies in its com-
prehensiveness. It comprises not only recent and more
familiar philosophical responses such as by Peter Bieri and
Michael Pauen, but also old arguments still worthy of
consideration such as those by Max Planck in 1923. An
informative chapter is the one on criminal law. It shows the
familiarity of the author with the forensic aspect, as she has
already co-authored a paper with Frank Urbaniok, psychi-
atrist and forensic expert witness. The reader might also
find helpful the information on methodological and con-
ceptual critique, coming from neuroscientists themselves.
Often the debate is presented as ‘‘neurobiology against the
humanities’’. But it is not just ethical or philosophical
concerns that can be raised against neural determinism,
there are also grave scientific objections, and it is the merit
of this book to have pointed out some of them.
But this shows that the shortness of the book is its
strength as well as its weakness. Arguments are often
presented rather than discussed. The reader is left with
different positions and has to make up his/her own mind.
Sometimes one would wish for a more detailed treatment,
rather than just juxtaposing arguments.
The author’s own summary at the end explicitly pro-
poses to refute neurobiological determinism on the grounds
of inner inconsistency. It is not empirically falsifiable and
therefore not scientific, but a question of belief (‘‘Glau-
benssatz’’). Roth and Singer, however, would rightly
object, that many scientific theories (among others evolu-
tionary theory) are not empirically falsifiable. And likewise
theologians would object, ‘belief’ is not primarily charac-
terized by its failure to be falsified. Her further arguments
are—against her own intent—consequentialistic: Without
free will, personhood and dignity are lost, and moral rel-
ativism or materialism will spread.
The author’s outlook is worth thinking about. We might
have to generate new concepts bridging the gap between
matter and mind. I have only my doubts about quantum
theory being (once again) the silver bullet.
Christina Aus der Au
Basel, Switzerland
Bayle, B.: A` la poursuite de l’enfant parfait. L’avenir de la
procre´ation humaine Paris: Robert Laffont, 2009. 321
pages. ISBN: 9782221108192. Price: € 20.
This is the sixth book of Benoıˆt Bayle, a clinical psy-
chiatrist at a hospital in Chartres, France, and a Doctor
of philosophy. The volume is devoted to a critical dis-
cussion of reproductive technologies in contemporary
liberal societies, of its ideology, and its practice. The
incentives as well as the justification of such technolo-
gies are often grounded in the ‘‘right’’ to have a child if
and when it is desired; they follow the logics of embryo
overproduction, embryo selection and embryo destruc-
tion. The principles and possible misuses of these pro-
cedures have been so far criticized mainly from the
philosophical, theological and biological perspectives.
The work of Bayle intends to explore the issue, and in
particular, the humanity of the unborn child, from the
viewpoint of psychology.
As a clinical psychiatrist, Bayle studies the prenatal
period of the infant. His analysis demonstrates and displays
the emergence of a psychopathological problematic from
the very moment of conception. Thus he is being led to
working out the notion of ‘‘conceptional identity.’’ Nobody
questions the child’s genetic identity, determined by the
fertilization of the maternal egg, thus being situated on a
biological level. It does exist however also a ‘‘conceptional
identity’’, thanks to which the human embryo enters at its
very conception into the psychosocial domain. An embryo
is ‘‘a being conceived by a man and a woman, at a certain
moment of the history of humankind and at a certain place
of the world’’ (p. 186). As soon as it is conceived, the
embryo is not only a biological being: it is also, from the
beginning, a psychological reality. His conceptional iden-
tity is determined by the conditions of his generation, his
history and the identity of those who called him to life. A
child conceived by a rape is suffering from an aggression
against its dignity, an aggression which has a bearing on
the very foundations of his identity. The being thus
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conceived embodies during his whole life the trauma of his
conception for those who are aware of it, as well as for
himself, in case he learns about it. The mother not only
continues to face the memory of the aggression, she also
bears the child who so to say embodies this aggression and
she relates to it according to this condition, i.e. as to a
subjectivity which makes the aggressor present. However
this does not yet mean to assert that the embryo would bear
the material marks of the traumatism which gave to it its
existence neither to assign to him self-consciousness.
According to Bayle, the being in gestation embodies a
history, it does possess an origin and a conceptional iden-
tity which confer to its biological body a specific subjec-
tivity, and all these elements constitute a decisive element
in the genesis of the prenatal relation between the mother
and the child. In this sense, the prenatal period represents
‘‘a regular stage’’ of the psychological history of a human
being (p. 225). This continuity is being illustrated in a
spectacular way through the analogy between the distur-
bances observed in children born by in vitro fertilization
and embryo selection, and those affecting the survivors of
natural and technical catastrophes. The prenatal period is
not only an authentic moment of the psychological genesis
of an individual, it is also a sphere of the interaction with
the mother. The baby the woman carries in her womb is
like a graft to assimilate, to integrate into herself, and ‘‘the
human being which is conceived does not simply take root
in the maternal body, it also implants in the mother’s
psychism’’ (p. 227).
Bayle’s studies contribute to a better understanding of
the ‘‘psychological gestation’’, this early construction of
the mother–child relationship of which they describe some
misadventures, like the often-talked about ‘‘denial of
pregnancy’’. The author’s insistence on the integration of
the prenatal period into the psychological gestation of a
human being sheds light upon reproductive technologies’
hidden premises. The self-justification of these procedures
is finally grounded on the acceptance of a radical difference
between those who are born and those who are not yet
born. But the psychoanalysis of the prenatal period refutes
this assumption. If however the embryo is not essentially
different from the child who is born, why should not he or
she possess the same human dignity which prescribes never
to treat somebody as a means but always as an end of our
action? This raises the question of the compatibility of the
unborn child’s dignity with the diverse reproductive tech-
nologies. In the same way as the design-baby ‘‘produced’’
to heal a sibling is an instrument because he is the object of
an intervention carried out for the sake of someone else, the
individuals called into existence to quench the desire for a
child are not appreciated by themselves but as regarded as
mere means. The autonomy of every human being com-
bined with their participation into intersubjective exchan-
ges reveals the truth of the human condition. At the same
time, the will to call into existence another individual is
mixed with the advent of him or her thanks to a natural
process. With his theory of ‘‘conceptional identity’’ B.
Bayle unveils the squalid message of reproductives tech-
nologies. To produce a desired child, one assumes the
legitimacy of manipulations leading to the destruction of a
multiplicity of human embryos. In this way, the child
effectively called into existence is a being entirely depen-
dent on the will of its authors. How could he thereafter
strive for an autonomous existence, how could then he
become himself? Reproductive technologies claim to pro-
vide us with a complete control of human fertility. They
however omit to mention that this power risks leading to a
degradation of the Other who is the child, by treating him
as a mere instrument.
Miklos Veto¨
Paris, France
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